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Much ink has been spilled in what have been 
called the “paradigm wars,” or battles within psy-
chology and related disciples about how we know—
and who judges—what is real. Efforts to establish 
the legitimacy of qualitative research have often 
taken the form of vociferous arguments for the 
merits of qualitative approaches, typically cast in 
terms of the contrasts between these and the more 
widely accepted quantitative approaches to knowl-
edge production. More recently, even as the push 
toward evidence-based practice gains momentum 
and predictably lists the field toward greater uni-
formity in acceptable approaches to establishing 
what can be deemed credible evidence, qualitative 
approaches have continued to strengthen in pres-
ence and broaden in reach. Once a seeming fledging 
movement, despite its long but sometimes forgotten 
history (Wertz et al., 2011), qualitative research in 
psychology appears to have come of age. This matu-
rity is reflected in the wide variety of philosophical 
approaches to qualitative research that have now 
firmly taken root.
In this chapter, we review some of the major 
overarching philosophical approaches to qualitative 
inquiry and include some historical background for 
each. Here, we offer a “big picture” view and leave 
it to other chapters in this section (on interpretive, 
critical, feminist, and indigenous approaches) to 
take a more fine-grained look at some of the par-
ticular fields of thought within these. Described by 
Denzin and Lincoln (2013) as “a field of inquiry in 
its own right” (p. 5), qualitative research cuts across 
disciplines and is represented in many areas of schol-
arship. We focus here on psychology, but recognize 
the substantial work done in related fields such as 
sociology, anthropology, social work, social policy, 
humanities, and the health sciences, in particular 
nursing. We cannot possibly do justice to the work 
that has been done in this arena in this one chapter. 
Entire volumes (c.f., Denzin & Lincoln, 2013) are 
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82  Philosophical Approaches to Qualitative Research
devoted to introducing researchers to these issues. 
We offer here what we hope is a concise and prac-
tical overview of some of the major philosophical 
assumptions that undergird qualitative research and 
shape its implementation today.
Once dominated by quantitative methods 
anchored in positivistic and post-positivistic research 
paradigms, a greater balance in the use of meth-
odological and philosophical approaches is now 
being utilized in psychological research (Ponterotto, 
2005; Rennie, Watson, & Monteiro, 2002). The 
importance of qualitative research has long been 
justified by many on the basis of Dilthey’s argument 
that the distinctive natures of natural science and 
human science called for different approaches: “We 
explain nature, but we understand psychic life” 
(1894/1977, p. 27; as cited in Wertz et al., p. 80). 
Today, qualitative methods are viewed as being 
particularly well-suited to addressing some of our 
most pressing issues and concerns, such as the influ-
ence of culture on psychological development and 
its role in psychological interventions (Ponterotto, 
Casas, Suzuki, & Alexander, 2010). The rise of par-
ticipatory action research (PAR), with its emphasis 
on social change and the empowerment of commu-
nity participants (Kemmis & McTaggart, 2005), 
has also required employing a range of qualitative 
approaches (i.e., focus groups, interviews, partici-
pant observation, photo-voice, and storytelling) to 
collecting data that contribute to the development 
of the kind of deeper understandings of the experi-
ences of the participants needed to effect meaning-
ful change.
The diversity of qualitative approaches can be 
dizzying and makes agreement about their appro-
priate use, in what forms, and according to what 
standards difficult, if not impossible. It can be 
challenging for “insiders” to navigate these issues, 
let alone the novice researcher wading into this ter-
rain. Seemingly simple questions about sample size 
and composition or the specific steps one should 
take in data analysis and how to achieve reliable 
findings can provoke lengthy discussion and even 
heated debates, with researchers take opposing posi-
tions and rooting their justification for these in 
foundational principles of qualitative research. Even 
more maddening for some, such questions may sim-
ply yield a repeated singular and highly unsatisfying 
response of “it depends.”
This seeming confusion can stem in part from 
differences in the purpose or aims of the research 
and in beliefs associated with core philosophies of 
science embedded within the varying approaches, 
namely ontology, epistemology, and axiology 
(Creswell, 2007; Hays & Singh, 2012; Ponterotto, 
2005). At its core, psychological research may be 
carried out with markedly distinct purposes, such 
as explaining and predicting aspects of the human 
experience, increasing our understanding of the 
lived experiences of different groups of people, or 
critiquing and changing the current conditions 
within which we live and strive to grow (Lincoln, 
Lynham, & Guba, 2013). These different aims may 
also be carried out using approaches to research 
that rest on differing foundational assumptions 
about the nature of our world (ontology) and our 
knowledge about it (epistemology), as well as the 
role of values in the process of knowledge produc-
tion (axiology), that are conceptualized by Hays and 
Singh (2012) as falling along separate continuums 
of beliefs.
Ontology is the study of the nature of reality. 
Within the context of qualitative research, ontology 
is discussed in terms of beliefs about the existence 
of some “universal truth” and about objectivity. 
At one end of the spectrum is a belief that real-
ity is objective and that there are universal truths 
about reality that can be known. At the other end 
is a belief that reality is subjective and contextual, 
and a universal understanding of psychological 
experiences cannot be obtained because they must 
always be understood within the contexts within 
which they are embedded (Hays & Singh, 2012). 
The crux of these viewpoints is also represented in 
the terms “emic” and “etic,” which are often used 
in anthropology and cultural psychology. These 
terms have been used to capture the distinction 
between experience-near understandings of culture 
and human experience, or what an insider within 
a local context would recognize and resonate with, 
and more experience-distant conceptualizations or 
abstractions about cultural processes (e.g., Geertz, 
1983). Etic can also be thought of as generaliza-
tions about human behavior that are universally 
true and emic as those that are contextually situ-
ated and not generalizable, such as local customs 
(Ponterotto, 2005).
Epistemology is the study of the process of 
knowing or “how we know what we know” (Guba 
& Lincoln, 2008; Ponterotto, 2005). It is con-
cerned with how we gain knowledge of what exists 
and the relationship between the knower—in this 
case the researcher—and the world. The researcher 
and research participant may be considered inde-
pendent of one another. In this view, researchers 
can use rigorous, systematic approaches to studying 
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Spencer,  Pryce,  Walsh 83
participants objectively or without researcher bias. 
This results in much attention being paid to rigor 
in research, particularly in the form of strict adher-
ence to generally accepted systematic approaches to 
enhancing objectivity and reducing researcher bias. 
On the other side of the continuum is an under-
standing of knowledge as being actively constructed 
by the researcher and participant, who exert mutual 
influence on one another. Rather than removing 
or guarding against researcher bias, the dynamic 
interaction between the researcher and participant 
is viewed as central to capturing the inherently con-
textualized experiences of the participant. Issues of 
rigor remain but take on different meanings and 
forms. The goal here is not to eliminate bias—
because that would be futile—but rather to enhance 
the trustworthiness of the findings by including and 
documenting multiple perspectives on the focus of 
the inquiry. In some cases, this might mean dem-
onstrating that the researcher became immersed 
enough in the participants’ experiences so as to 
credibly represent and interpret them. In others, 
this might involve triangulating the data sources 
and/or the investigators.
Axiology is concerned with how values and 
assumptions of the researcher influence the scien-
tific process, as well as what actions the researcher 
takes with the research produced (Lincoln et  al., 
2013). What place do the emotions, expectations, 
and values of the researcher have in the research 
process? Should systematic steps be taken to ensure 
that the process is kept free of these so that they do 
not influence the participants and the results? Or is 
such a pursuit futile and the best a researcher can 
do is identify, describe, or even attempt to “bracket” 
(Wertz, 2011) his or her values? Much qualitative 
research today rests on the assumption that research 
is “radically relational” and is inevitably shaped, 
and even intentionally informed, by the researcher’s 
orientation, values, and personal qualities (Wertz 
et al., 2011, p. 84). In research that seeks to change 
the status quo with regard to the unequal distribu-
tion of power and resources, such as in PAR, the 
researcher’s experience is central to the process and 
may be key to achieving the intended outcomes of 
the research (Ponterotto, 2005). With regard to 
action, the positions range from researcher as dis-
tant observer of the study participants to researcher 
as change agent who is deliberately striving to 
achieve social justice through the work produced.
In some cases, the assumptions of a researcher 
may align more neatly along one side of these contin-
uums. For example, a feminist researcher may hold 
that there are multiple truths and that knowledge is 
constructed in relationship with study participants, 
with the values and assumptions of the researcher 
integral to the construction of this knowledge. In 
others, the assumptions may be more mixed, such 
as a researcher who endorses a constructivist view of 
reality but views researcher reflexivity as less central 
to the research process. When these differing onto-
logical, epistemological, and axiological stances go 
unacknowledged, the differences among qualitative 
approaches can seem as vast as those between quan-
titative and qualitative methods. As Camic, Rhodes, 
and Yardley (2003), among many, have argued, the 
principle that should unify us is the need for coher-
ence between the nature of our questions and the 
methodological and philosophical approach taken 
to answering them.
In the next sections, we review the follow-
ing major overarching philosophical approaches 
that guide and structure qualitative research: 
post-positivism, constructivism, critical theory, 
feminism, and queer theory. We offer a brief history 
of each of the approaches; consider the ontologi-
cal, epistemological, and axiological assumptions on 
which they rest; and detail some of the distinguish-
ing features while also attempting to capture some 
of the diversity within them. We also touch on some 
prominent applications of these approaches to qual-
itative research in psychology. We recognize that 
these approaches have been grouped and defined 
in varying ways and that they defy this sort of tidy 
categorization. Still, we draw some lines here in an 
effort to highlight distinctive ideas within each. 
Also included are discussions of applications of each 
of the approaches.
Philosophical Approaches
Post-Positivism
Post-positivism grew out of the positivist view of 
science, and together these have dominated research 
in psychology for much of the field’s history (Packer, 
2011). Positivism rests on the ontological assump-
tion that some objective truth or reality exists that 
is independent of our beliefs and constructions 
and can be ascertained through direct observation 
and experience. The efforts of science, thus, are put 
toward establishing universal laws of nature and, 
within psychology, universal laws of human devel-
opment and experience. The attainment of this 
knowledge and our confidence in it depends on fol-
lowing systematic procedures through which claims 
about truth can be verified. Hypothesis generation 
and testing using valid measures of operationally 
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84  Philosophical Approaches to Qualitative Research
defined variables are primary tools, and the goal is 
to be able, with confidence, to generalize the knowl-
edge obtained to some larger general population. 
Post-positivism introduces the idea that hypotheses 
can never actually be proven beyond any doubt and 
that theory should tested in order to be falsified 
as well as verified. Issues of validity and reliability 
are of central importance in research within this 
paradigm, as are considerations of credible alterna-
tive hypotheses to explain the phenomenon being 
studied.
History
Post-positivism is rooted in logical positivism, 
a term coined by a group of scientists, mathemati-
cians, and philosophers in the early 1900s known 
as the Vienna Circle. Building on the “positive phi-
losophy” of Auguste Comte, but also emphasizing 
the importance of formal logic in scientific inves-
tigation, these thinkers determined that science 
required a systematic way of organizing our direct 
observations of experience and sought to induc-
tively build laws of the natural world based on the 
construction of meaningful and unambiguous logi-
cal statements (Packer, 2011). Only statements of 
fact that could be verified in some way or tested 
empirically were considered to be meaningful in the 
scientific endeavor.
Karl Popper (1934/1959) objected to the idea 
that this kind of inductive construction and con-
firmation of factual, logical statements that were 
purportedly free from personal and theoretical bias 
could lead to certainty about the natural world. 
Instead, he argued that the laws of science had to be 
built through a process of falsification or testing of 
hypotheses. He argued that data disproving hypoth-
eses are more definitive than those supporting them, 
as in any given study there is always the risk that 
the data gathered do not accurately or fully repre-
sent the real world being studied. The disconfirming 
case or cases may simply have not made it into the 
sample drawn for study.
Foundational assumptions
Post-positivism retains the belief in an observ-
able external reality and the existence of universal 
truths but contends that a fully accurate representa-
tion of them can never be achieved with certitude 
(Popper, 1934/1959). Although things exist beyond 
our experience of them, it is recognized that our 
knowledge of this world is socially constructed. Bias 
is unavoidable. All observations are fallible because 
they are inherently laden with our individual and 
cultural biases. Although we can never get to the 
truth with any certainty, post-positivists contend 
that we should continually strive to come as close as 
we possibly can. Because all measurement is biased 
and introduces error, issues of reliability and valid-
ity are paramount. Great attention is paid to reduc-
ing or controlling for bias through the design of the 
research and the use of clearly defined techniques 
such as controls groups and multiple forms of mea-
surement or triangulation. This attempt to remove 
or at least reduce bias extends to the subjectivity 
of the researcher as well as to the intentions of the 
research. The researcher is to remain as neutral as 
possible throughout the research process and should 
not engage in research in the service of advocacy for 
any particular position within their field.
From a post-positivist perspective, the existence 
of multiple worldviews does not extend into a belief 
in complete relativism and an incommensurabil-
ity of perspectives—the belief that our differences 
in experiences and culture mean that we can never 
understand each other. Whereas we may never 
achieve objectivity in the true sense of the word, we 
can employ systematic ways of checking our biases 
both individually and collectively through engaging 
in the scientific enterprise within a community of 
people who critically review one another’s work.
implications For researcH metHods
Research rooted in post-positivism aims to 
explain psychological phenomenon by identify-
ing factors that predict particular outcomes and 
the relationships between them. A  priori theory 
about how things are related is used to guide the 
research, which then seeks to verify or falsify these 
theory-based ideas. Having confidence in the find-
ings from such research rests on the rigor with 
which systematic steps in the research process are 
employed. Multiple levels of data analysis and tak-
ing steps to ensure validity contribute to the rigor 
of the research, and the results of these studies are 
typically written in the form of scientific reports 
similar in structure to that used for the reporting of 
quantitative studies.
application
Grounded theory, a now widely used approach 
to qualitative research, as traditionally con-
structed aligns most closely with positivistic and 
post-positivistic assumptions (Bryant & Charmaz, 
2010). It was first developed by Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) in response to what they considered to be 
an overemphasis on hypothesis testing and the 
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verification of theory in sociological research. They 
argued that the work of theory generation could 
not be complete and that all human experience was 
unlikely to be captured and accounted for by the 
existing grand theories of the time. They put forth 
grounded theory as a systematic approach to quali-
tative data collection and analysis to be carried out 
with the explicit purpose of discovering new theory 
from data or building new theory from the ground 
up, rather than by logical deductions from a priori 
assumptions. Although grounded theory turned the 
process of scientific inquiry in the post-positivist 
tradition on its head by beginning with the collec-
tion of data to use to ultimately build theory rather 
than collecting data to prove or disprove existing 
theory, the foundational assumptions on which tra-
ditional grounded theory rests are largely rooted in 
post-positivism. That said, constructive approaches 
to grounded theory have also been articulated and 
widely implemented (e.g., Charmaz, 2006), and 
others have argued that grounded theory techniques 
can be implemented using a variety of philosophical 
approaches (Birks & Mills, 2011).
Traditional grounded theory “accepts that there 
is an external world that can be described, analyzed, 
explained and predicted:  truth, but with a small 
t” (Charmaz, 2000, p.  524). Part of the intent of 
grounded theory was to codify qualitative research 
methods and put forth a systematic set of explicit 
strategies for carrying out the research process, with 
the assumption being that following a systematic set 
of methods would lead to the discovery of real phe-
nomena and the development of verifiable “theo-
ries” of them (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Such work, 
however, requires getting out into the field to collect 
rich data on which to build these theories. Some of 
the defining features of a grounded theory approach 
are (a)  simultaneous data collection and analysis, 
(b) the development of codes from the data rather 
than from theory, (c) constant comparison of data 
at all levels of the data collection and analytic pro-
cess, (d)  theoretical sampling to serve the purpose 
of theory generation rather than representativeness 
of the sample, and (e) memo writing to define and 
elaborate on emerging categories and the relation-
ships among them (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss 
& Corbin, 1998).
Social Constructionism
The tenets of the discipline throughout the 
twentieth century tended to place social construc-
tionism at the opposite pole of experimental social 
psychology (Jost & Kruglanski 2002), with the idea 
being that work in social psychology should fall on 
either end of the spectrum: you either do quantita-
tive experiments or you engage in qualitative stud-
ies that are undergirded by a social constructionist 
paradigm. Although the two extremes have begun 
to meet in the middle in recent years, it is important 
to examine the role that the social constructionist 
perspective has played in shaping our thinking and 
work in the field of psychological research.
The notion of social construction first gained 
popularity in the United States after the publication 
of Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) seminal book, 
The Social Construction of Reality. Relying on the 
work of Schutz, Berger and Luckmann argued that 
all of our understandings and knowledge are socially 
constructed. The idea is that we create our own real-
ity through social interactions, relationships, and 
experiences. From the ontological perspective, real-
ity is context- and socially relative, and therefore 
many realities can exist simultaneously (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1966; Gergen, 1996). If our reality is 
constructed, then, too, our knowledge and mean-
ings are derived from social interactions. Individuals 
hold them in their minds, but the epistemological 
notion of reality and meanings are not individual 
in nature but instead are constantly “negotiating 
meaning” (Gergen, 1996).
This has significant implications for both how 
we analyze the findings from past research in the 
field as well as how we shape future research proj-
ects. As Gergen (1996) states, “research findings 
don’t have any meaning until they are interpreted” 
and interpretations “result from a process of negoti-
ating meaning in the community (119).” The data 
do not reveal anything in or of themselves; instead, 
it is the way that psychologists utilize and interpret 
the data that reveals meaning. But again, it is not a 
truth that is revealed, or rather it is a truth, the truth 
that the researcher, given his or her experiences and 
knowledge, created while interacting with the social 
environment. Diverse and influential work, such 
as Milgram’s (1974) experiment and Burr’s (1998) 
work on the social construction of gender, illustrates 
the power of social interactions to frame and influ-
ence our understandings and realities.
Perhaps most importantly for our purposes, 
social construction highlights the social creation of 
identity. Identity creation and maintenance is work 
that we are constantly engaged in as individuals; we 
use Goffmanian (1955) performances and props 
to test how others interpret our identities, which 
then impacts how we think of our identity. This is 
also true for the related notion of self-worth. In an 
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interesting study examining the social construction 
of identity among the homeless in Austin, Texas, 
Snow and Anderson (1987) found that there can 
be both a social identity (the identity that society 
gives you) and a personal identity (the identity you 
hold in your mind). Traditionally, these would be 
thought to align, but through a social construc-
tion approach Snow and Anderson (1987) argued 
that there are cases in which people cannot easily 
reconcile the public and personal. This has obvious 
implications for the field of social psychology and 
identity research.
Social construction, as defined by Berger and 
Luckmann (1966), suggests that reality is con-
stantly in flux as it is negotiated and renegotiated 
through our experiences social worlds. From this 
core idea, other branches of social construction, 
such as symbolic interaction, phenomenology, and 
ethnomethodology, have evolved. Because they all 
fall under the social construction umbrella, it can 
be difficult at times to determine their differences. 
How does symbolic interactionism really differ 
from phenomenology, for example? The following 
sections lay out these three offshoots of social con-
struction and attempt to present both their histori-
cal precedence as well as their current engagement 
with the discipline.
symbolic interactionism
History
The symbolic interactionist approach was first 
developed in the early 1900s by George Herbert 
Mead (1913) at the University of Chicago. He was a 
member of the eminent group of sociologists (loosely 
termed at the time because he also taught philoso-
phy) working as part of the Chicago School in the 
early to mid-1900s. The Chicago School came to 
be known in particular for the development of the 
symbolic interactionist approach to studying daily 
life. Mead argued that society and all its component 
parts—structures, interactions, and meanings—are 
developed through social interactions, thus macro-
analyses can and should really be reduced to their 
smaller microlevel interactions. The theory was 
popular during the time of the Chicago School and 
was then expanded and adapted by Herbert Blumer 
in 1960s. Blumer did not like the emphasis placed 
on macrolevel structures that dominated most of 
the sociological research at the time and thought 
that symbolic interactionism offered an alternative 
theoretical framework. Blumer’s work (1969) was 
resurrected as an empirical framework in the 1980s, 
and its popularity has ebbed and flowed since. One 
of the most renowned sociologists utilizing sym-
bolic interactionism today is Sheldon Stryker at 
Indiana University.
Foundational Assumptions
Although Mead did not refer to the theory as 
such, symbolic interactionism is based on the 
overarching premise that all aspects of society are 
socially constituted. From macrolevel power struc-
tures to microlevel daily interactions, all are cre-
ated through social interactions at various levels. 
Embedded in this perspective is the notion that 
meanings (about these power structures, interac-
tions, etc.) are derived from social interactions. For 
both Mead and Blumer, the unit of analysis is the 
individual, not society or institutions. They were 
both reacting against the notion that social struc-
tures (i.e., socioeconomic stats) explain outcomes. 
Structures, according to symbolic interactionists, 
are just groups of people repeatedly engaged in 
interaction.
Our social interactions lead us to develop “shared 
meanings” (Sandstrom, Martin, & Fine, 2006); 
through our interactions with others, we take on 
common definitions of emotions, experiences, and 
ways of acting. Thus, for example, gender norms 
may be taught, both consciously and unconsciously 
from early childhood; in this way, a female under-
stands what it “means” to be a woman in her society 
without ever being explicitly told. A girl does not 
learn this in a bubble; rather, it is through her social 
interactions with others that she comes to under-
stand what constitutes appropriate behavior, dress, 
appearance, and the like. She learns this through her 
experiences and the responses she gets from others.
Symbolic interactionism “stresses that people cre-
ate, negotiate, and change social meanings through 
the process of interaction” (Sandstrom et al., 2006, 
p. 1). The key point here, for Blumer and others, is 
that meanings are constantly evolving. So, to follow 
the example just mentioned, our understanding of 
gender is not a fixed fact (because it might be differ-
ent in different regions, religions, and time periods) 
but the result of previously experienced gendered 
interactions in our past. We take our previous inter-
actions with us and apply them to the next inter-
action. Interactions, even with people we have just 
met, are not completely insulated events. Rather, 
each person brings to the interaction all of his or 
her previous interactions and meanings. Thus, a 
man and a woman in conversation will bring to this 
exchange all of their previously held ideas about 
femininity and masculinity, which they will use as 
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a guide for navigating this new interaction. And of 
ultimate importance is Goffman’s (1959) notion 
of the feedback loop; you act based on your prior 
understandings, receive feedback from your new 
partner, and then take this new feedback with you 
into your future interactions. As this process con-
tinues, you may alter your meanings, and poten-
tially your behavior, over time. It is a process, not 
a set plan.
Because behavior and meaning are social con-
stituted, so, too, is the self. Most symbolic inter-
actionists would argue that there is no core/true 
individual identity. Rather, we engage in identity 
work in which take on different identities to man-
age the diversity of our social interactions. So, for 
example, in the classroom setting, one takes on the 
role of either professor or student. Out of this con-
text, we may take on an entirely different identity, 
such as mother. None of these identities represents 
our “true self,” but rather they are all appropriate 
context-specific roles. We base these roles on what 
Goffman (1959) called “the generalized other” or 
the group/people we interact with. So, we base 
our mothering role on our interactions with our 
children, our experiences with our own parents, 
friends, and media/cultural influences. As the “gen-
eralized other” changes, so do our identities. As a 
result of the primacy of social interactions, Mead’s 
original theory is a very fluid one. Meanings are 
iterative because they are informed by our ongoing 
interactions.
Implications for Research Methods
The legacy of symbolic interactionism for 
research in psychology is an important one. First, 
the notion that all behaviors, from internal thoughts 
to outward interactions, are socially constituted 
has an impact on the psychological discourse. For 
researchers, this means that the participant cannot 
be looked at simply as an individual but rather as 
an individual in the social context. Thus, a person’s 
thoughts and judgments are not solely the prod-
uct of his or her own mind, but rather of his or 
her understandings based on social interactions 
(Sandstrom et  al., 2006). And, additionally, one 
of the byproducts of social interaction is feedback 
about ourselves; we internalize others’ perceptions 
of us, which can in turn influence our self-concept 
(Cook & Douglas 1998). This has significant impli-
cations for any researchers studying mental health 
because it means that the mind is no longer a solely 
internal, individual unit of analysis. Our thoughts, 
ideas, hopes, and fears are all rooted in the social 
world and therefore have both social causes and 
consequences. Therefore, the “social act” should be 
the unit of analysis (Sandstrom et al., 2006).
Symbolic interactionists also highlight individ-
ual agency to form and change the world around us. 
Individuals “designate meanings, define situations 
and plan lines of action. In so doing, they actively 
construct the reality of their environment and exer-
cise a measure of control over it” (Sandstrom et al., 
2006, p. 6). We do this through the process of inter-
acting, reflecting on, and evaluating interactions, 
and acting. This process is dynamic and, at least to 
some degree, controlled by the individual. There 
is no right or set meaning or type of interaction. 
Instead, we each create our own realities based on 
our understandings and meanings. Thus, it is still 
possible for two people to react to the same interac-
tion very differently because each will bring his or 
her own history of social interactions and meanings 
to this experience.
Rooting the theory in individual meanings 
and experiences has implications for the types of 
research methods symbolic interactionists will 
utilize. The most commonly utilized approaches 
are ethnography, grounded theory, and narrative 
analysis because these methods allow the themes 
to emerge from the data, thereby preserving the 
individual experiences and realities. These methods 
more readily address the question of how people 
make meaning out of experiences in their lives and 
do not allow the researcher’s assumptions and own 
set of meanings to dictate the findings that emerge 
from the data.
Application
The border between social psychology and soci-
ology is often blurred by researchers in both disci-
plines’ use of symbolic interactionism. In particular, 
Stryker (1987) argued that the movement in psy-
chology away from behaviorism and toward a value 
placed on subjective experience is the result of the 
use of symbolic interactionism as a lens through 
which to examine psychological research. Thus, it 
is fair to say that the scope of symbolic interaction-
ism’s influence is far reaching within the field. One 
interesting study that took a symbolic interactionist 
approach is Ponticelli’s (1999) study of former lesbi-
ans who, due to religious involvement in an minis-
try that does not acknowledge homosexuality, must 
reframe their sexual identities to align with their 
newly acquired religious beliefs. Ponticelli’s research 
method involved eight months of participant obser-
vations, interviews, and material analysis, and her 
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goal was to understand the ways that the ex-lesbians 
in her study construct a narrative of their sexual-
ity. Symbolic interactionism lends itself well to this 
kind of study because it brings participants’ own 
understandings and narratives to the study rather 
than the researcher’s personal assessment of the par-
ticipants’ stories. Additionally, Ponticelli’s study also 
incorporates a symbolic interactionist approach in 
its attempt to focus on the ways that meaning is cre-
ated and adjusted over time.
pHenomenology
History
Phenomenology was first established by Edmund 
Husserl in the early 1900s. It has subsequently been 
used as an approach within psychology as well as 
in other disciplines in the social sciences. Husserl’s 
original goal was to find a way to conduct objective 
scientific analysis of subjective topics, such as emo-
tion. Phenomenology, along with the ideologically 
similar symbolic interactionism, has been an impor-
tant philosophical approach underpinning much of 
psychological research. In particular, phenomenol-
ogy has influenced the Duquesne School as well as 
the experimental approaches utilized in psychologi-
cal research. In spite of the influence of phenom-
enology within the field of psychology, over time, its 
theoretical premise has been challenged by some of 
the field’s giants: James, Skinner, and Watson have 
at various times all challenged phenomenology and 
advocated a more scientific approach to the disci-
pline of psychology. The debate continues today, 
and many researchers still question what constitutes 
phenomenological research as well as its merits as a 
philosophical framework.
Foundational Assumptions
Phenomenology is rooted in the notion that all 
of our knowledge and understanding of the world 
comes from our experiences (Hein & Austin, 
2001). At their core, there are significant similarities 
between phenomenology and symbolic interaction-
ism in that both focus on the ways our engage-
ment with society affects our worldviews. However, 
whereas symbolic interactionism focuses on the 
ways that social interactions affect our meaning, 
phenomenology takes the broader aim of studying 
experiences (phenomena). But, like symbolic inter-
actionism, the focus is not on the events themselves, 
but rather on the ways in which we experience 
things and the meanings these experiences create 
for us. As Kockelmans (1973) writes, it is “bring-
ing to light the usually hidden meanings which 
motivate the concrete modes of man’s orientation 
toward the world” (p. 274). As such, those who uti-
lize the phenomenological approach seek to make 
explicit the “taken-for-grantedness”  assumptions 
that guide our experiences (Hein & Austin, 2001, 
p.  6). In essence, there is no objective reality, but 
rather it is our experiences and our perceptions of 
these experiences (i.e., our lived experiences) that 
are our reality. Given that the meanings we create 
from our experiences are largely based on the social 
context (Smith, 2011), there is a clear link to sym-
bolic interactionism.
Additionally, phenomenologists believe that 
behavior is a reflection of our previous experiences; 
we act in response to our temporal and spatial mem-
ories of past experiences or, as Keen (1975) writes, 
“behavior is an expression of being in the world” 
(p.  27). Thinking about behavior as a product of 
our past experiences forces us to consider action and 
individual agency as embedded in a broader social 
context. Related to this question of behavior is the 
notion of intentionality; namely, the idea that every 
experience is in response to or connected to some past 
experience. Thus, attempting to examine the experi-
ence as “in the moment” is, from a phenomenologi-
cal perspective, missing the unique understandings 
the individual brought to the current experience.
Implications for Research Methods
As a research method, phenomenology involves 
studying how we make sense of our experiences or 
“participant perspectives” (Bogdan & Biklen, 1998, 
p. 26). Therefore, as researchers, we cannot assume 
that we know what meanings people make of cer-
tain events. For example, even though we may think 
the standard response is to be sad after the death of 
a parent, we cannot presume that a participant in 
our study feels this or any other emotion. The job 
of the researcher is to uncover what it is people take 
for granted (i.e., what they might not even think 
to tell us in an interview and what we might not 
think to ask because we assume they think like we 
do). To do this, the researcher must first come to 
understand the assumptions and biases he or she 
brings to the research. Underlying phenomeno-
logical research is the notion of bracketing assump-
tions, which is the idea that, before we can conduct 
any analysis of our data, we must first explore our 
own biases or the “taken-for-grantedness” (Hein & 
Austin, 2001, p. 6) that make up our unique per-
spectives. Of course, there is no way we, as research-
ers, can operate outside of our assumptions and 
experiences. However, the self-reflection for which 
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phenomenologists advocate does at least charge the 
researcher with keeping these biases in mind when 
conducting analysis.
Approaching a research question with the 
assumption that experience forms the basis for 
behavior and understanding fundamentally lends 
itself to certain research methods. In particular, uti-
lizing methods that emphasize gathering data on 
lived experience from the participant’s perspective 
is essential. To that end, methods such as ethno-
methodology, ethnography, and narrative analysis 
are particularly relevant for researchers utilizing the 
phenomenological approach because all of these 
methods focus on uncovering the meanings indi-
viduals give to their experiences.
Application
A great deal of the research in psychotherapy is 
rooted in the phenomenological approach because 
many scholars in this field see as their goal “dis-
covering psychological meanings by identifying 
the essential psychological structure of an inter-
viewee’s description of an experience” (Camic 
et  al., 2003, p.  8). A  concrete example of this 
comes from Carl Rogers’s client-centered therapy 
(1951). Rogers found that many of his patients 
struggled not with what actually happened—that 
is, the “in the moment” reality—but with their 
perceptions and feelings about what happened. As 
a result, therapy must be targeted to address the 
individual’s set of perceptions and understand-
ings. To follow up with the example of a person 
dealing with the death of a parent, a therapist can-
not follow a preset protocol for helping the cli-
ent because each patient’s experiences and feelings 
about death will be different.
From the perspective of social psychology, the 
phenomenological approach has implications 
for how we conduct and think about research on 
identity. In its most general sense, phenomenol-
ogy de-emphasizes the self as a unique individual, 
which has implications for the types of research 
questions we ask, as well as for the methods we uti-
lize. A  phenomenological study of identity allows 
for open-ended questions that allow participants to 
present, through the construction of a narrative for 
example, what identity means to them and how it 
functions in their lives. This is especially relevant for 
factors such as gender, race and ethnicity, and socio-
economic status, which, depending on our con-
text, can constrain or enhance our experiences and 
interactions. One example of this type of work is 
Friedman, Friedlander, and Blustein’s (2005) study 
that used a phenomenological approach to develop 
an understanding of how Jews construct their col-
lective religious and ethnic identity as a highly 
assimilated but still distinct population within the 
United States.
A well-defined method with some roots in phe-
nomenology (among other approaches) is con-
sensual qualitative research (CQR; Hill, Knox, 
Thompson, Williams, Hess, & Ladany, 2005; Hill, 
Thompson, & Williams, 1997). It is a method for 
interview research that has been used in numerous 
studies in psychology, especially within counseling 
psychology. Consensual qualitative research is actu-
ally constructivist in ontology, in that it assumes 
multiple realities, and in epistemology because the 
researcher experience matters and informs inter-
view question development. However, it also has 
post-positivistic leanings, with its emphasis on con-
sensus among a team of researchers in the construc-
tion of findings, close adherence to a systematic 
approach, and interest in generalization and (Hill 
et al., 2005).
In CQR, consistent data are collected across 
participants through semistructured interviews and 
then analyzed by multiple “judges” who must come 
to a consensus about the meaning of the data. At 
least one “auditor” also checks the “primary team 
of judges” to work against the potential for group-
think. Data analysis is carried out in three steps. 
First, participant responses to the open-ended inter-
view questions are divided into domains or topic 
areas. Then, core ideas, which are abstracts or brief 
“summaries of the data that capture the essence of 
what was said in fewer words and with greater clar-
ity” are constructed within each domain for each 
individual case (Hill et al., 2005, p. 200). Finally, 
cross-case analysis is carried out by developing cat-
egories that describe the common themes reflected 
in the core ideas within domains across cases.
Consensus is at the core of the CQR method, 
with the assumption being that consideration 
of multiple perspectives brings us closer in our 
approximation of the “truth” and reduces the 
influence of researcher bias (Hill, Thompson, & 
Williams, 1997). Using teams of three to five ana-
lysts, coders first look at the data independently 
and then come together to discuss their ideas 
until consensus about the single best representa-
tion of the data is reached. The goal here is not 
what is typically thought of as interrater reli-
ability, wherein preagreement about how to code 
data is established and then carried out with the 
goal of achieving the highest levels of accuracy in 
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agreement in coding. Rather, it is expected, and 
even hoped, that team members will begin with 
different ideas about the data so that the final 
product reflects and integrates multiple perspec-
tives and is less fraught with individual bias. The 
potential for groupthink is minimized through the 
use of one or two additional team members who 
serve as auditors to review and check the primary 
team’s interpretations and judgments. The audi-
tors review the work of the primary team once the 
core ideas for each domain have been established 
consensually and then again when the cross-case 
categories have been determined. At each of these 
stages, the auditors review the raw material and 
provide comments back to the primary team who 
must then carefully consider each comment and 
determine through discussion whether to accept 
or reject each one.
Critical Theory
Critical theory as an approach represents a key 
postmodern paradigm and offers alternatives to 
the postmodernist and constructivist lenses. In 
the context of research, the application of critical 
theory emphasizes the ways by which the values of 
the researcher and those studied impact the social 
world. This point of view contributes to a larger 
shift in research over the past several decades (Kidd 
& Kral, 2005), one that privileges meaning and 
requires a rethinking of knowledge (Goodman & 
Fisher, 1995).
History
Critical theory has had many distinct historical 
phases that cross several generations. The birth of this 
paradigm is considered to have taken place through 
the Institute for Social Research at the University 
of Frankfurt am Main during 1929–1930. During 
this time, the arrival of the “Frankfurt School” 
philosophers and social theorists (Creswell, 2007), 
including Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and 
Herbert Marcuse, marked an idealistic, utopian 
vision that stretched beyond the more customary 
“positivist” tradition of the time. This emergence 
offered criticism to the status, structure, and goal of 
the traditional social sciences (Adorno et al., 1969). 
The German philosophers and social theorists of 
the Frankfurt School were influenced by the barba-
rism of World War I and what was perceived as the 
inhumanity of post-war capitalism so widespread in 
Europe at the time. During World War II, several 
key contributors to the School moved to the United 
States in an effort to escape the war. Once in the 
United States, these thinkers were struck by the gulf 
between the stated progressive agenda within the 
United States and the very real differences between 
races and social classes present, in large part due to 
discrimination (Ponterotto, 2005).
According to these theorists, “critical” theory 
may be distinguished from “traditional” theories to 
the extent that it seeks human emancipation and a 
disruption of the status quo. Ontologically, critical 
theory challenges the idea that reality is natural and 
objective because reality is shaped by social, politi-
cal, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender-based 
forces into social structures. Instead, critical theo-
rists assume that reality can only come to be known 
through a subjective frame and as shaped by values 
and mediated by power relations that are socially 
and historically constituted.
More recently, Jurgen Habermas’s (1988; 1990) 
work on communicative reason and linguistic inter-
subjectivity has represented iconic work in critical 
theory in the more modern era. Habermas’s work 
has enabled strategies of community building and 
social movements based on his work in communi-
cation. This work has not taken place without scru-
tiny, however. Theorists such as Nikolas Kompridis 
have opposed some of Habermas’s ideas (Kompridis, 
2006), claiming that these recent approaches have 
undermined the original aims of social change 
espoused by critical theory, particularly in terms of 
the critique of modern capitalism.
Foundational assumptions
According to Horkheimer, a critical theory is 
adequate only if it is explanatory, practical, and 
normative (1972). In other words, it has to address 
what is wrong with current social reality, identify 
the actors to change it, provide clear norms for criti-
cism, and identify practical goals for social trans-
formation. The orientation of this theory is toward 
transformation, traditionally of capitalism into a 
“real democracy”.
Foundation ideals are based on a fundamental 
struggle for equality and social justice. Knowledge 
is used to emancipate the oppressed, and “validity 
is found when research creates action” (Lincoln, 
Lynham, & Guba, 2011, p. 114). Given this defi-
nition, a number of “critical theories” have been 
developed to demonstrate differences in power in 
the areas of gender, race and ethnicity, class, sexual 
orientation, and disabilities, many of which have 
emerged in connection with the social movements 
associated with these areas, particularly in the 
United States. In short, a critical theory provides the 
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basis and groundwork for research aimed at decreas-
ing domination and increasing freedom.
Critical theory by and large rejects the assump-
tion that a scientific or objective basis of criticism 
needs to be grounded in a grand theory. Rather, 
epistemologically, critical theory privileges agents’ 
own knowledge and understandings, with an 
assumption that these understandings can be a basis 
for social criticism in themselves. In other words, 
theories can have “a relative legitimacy” (Habermas, 
1988, p. 3). Habermas also argues that, relative to 
other existing theories, the role of critical theory is 
to unify these multiple theories, considering their 
varied methods and presuppositions (Habermas, 
1988). Given this role, it stands to reason that any 
social scientific method or explanation-producing 
theory can be potentially critical.
Similarly, in critical theory, the relationship 
between researcher and participant is transactional, 
subjective, and dialectic. In other words, what can 
be known is inextricably tied to the interaction 
between an investigator and an object or group. 
Insofar as one can separate oneself from marginal-
ized groups in an effort to remain “objective,” one 
removes oneself from one’s “share” of the social 
condition studied, likely perpetuating the inequali-
ties that contribute to the adverse social conditions 
often of interest to social scientists.
Researchers who employ critical theory take 
values a step further than constructivists do in that 
they hope and expect their value biases to influence 
the research process and outcome. More specifically, 
because critical theory concerns itself with unequal 
distributions of power and the resultant oppression 
of subjugated groups, a preset goal of the research is 
to empower participants to transform the status quo 
and emancipate themselves from ongoing oppres-
sion. Thus, critical theorist researchers acknowledge 
at the outset that they expect results to document 
the high levels of stress or disadvantage of the group 
under study. Beyond this, such researchers aim to 
use the results and report of the study in some way to 
advocate for improvement of the examined group.
implications For researcH metHods
Critical theorists, given their stance on the 
importance of researcher–participant interac-
tion and the significance of understanding values 
as influencing the reality under study, more often 
use naturalistic designs in which the researcher is 
engaged in the daily life of participants. Critical 
theoretical approaches tend to rely on dialogic 
methods, which may combine data collection 
methods (e.g., participant observation, in-depth 
interviewing, first-person written reports) with 
opportunity for reflection. This approach inten-
tionally invites a questioning of the “natural” status 
quo and order and an exploration of the tensions 
that characterize the social issue under exploration. 
Inherently challenging, this approach values trans-
parency and welcomes opportunities for alternative 
paradigms to be considered as part of the learning 
process itself.
Methodologically, contexts are not merely con-
ceptualized as “variables,” but as essential parts of 
subjectivity according to critical theory. In terms 
of the field of psychology, this approach invites 
us to consider the role of research in terms of how 
liberation might take shape across the lifespan. 
Qualitative approaches in which a researcher’s social 
justice values help direct inquiry, such as PAR (Kidd 
& Kral, 2005), provide ample example of critical 
theory at work in the research context.
application in tHe Field
Participatory action research is a form of action 
research anchored in the belief that the research pro-
cess itself serves as a mechanism for social change. 
Participatory action research is an approach focused 
on critical theory because, at its core, PAR is geared 
toward empowerment of participants that leads to 
emancipation from oppression and enhanced qual-
ity of life. In laypersons’ terms, “you get people 
affected by a problem together, figure out what is 
going on as a group, and then do something about 
it” (Kidd & Kral, 2005, p. 187).
According to Kemmis and McTaggart (2005), 
PAR often involves a cycle of self-reflection and 
action in addressing a community problem. 
Participants and researchers establish a collaborative 
relationship as they ask critical questions about the 
current life situation. This dialogue moves the group 
to action as they develop knowledge and further 
explore the problem and how it can be addressed. 
In this way, collaborators using PAR begin to set a 
stage of social action to instigate change.
The process of change emerges and shifts as part 
of the self-reflective cycles, but typically is not pre-
determined by a clear series of procedural and ana-
lytic steps. Instead, during the reflective and action 
spiral, PAR investigators rely on a wide variety of 
methods and procedures as they gradually better 
understand the needs of the community. As such, 
many studies that use PAR take on varied methods 
such as storytelling, sharing experiences, individual 
and focus group interviews, participant observation, 
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drawings, and even the more structured qualitative 
interview or quantitative survey as the need merits.
When engaged in a PAR process, study partici-
pants are expected to participate fully. However, 
the creation of such participatory contexts is very 
challenging and time-consuming, and is not the 
norm (Kidd & Kral, 2005). Disempowered groups 
are seldom given the opportunity and at times are 
discouraged from this type of action. Further com-
pounding this problem is the tendency for estab-
lished forums (e.g., academia) to claim exclusive 
ownership of methods of knowledge gathering and 
avenues for change. All of these challenges further 
lend the process of PAR to be informed by criti-
cal theory. As a specific example, Dentith, Measor, 
and O’Malley (2012) outline the practice of using 
critical theory across three separate research projects 
involving young people facing various life difficul-
ties and vulnerabilities. In so doing, they highlight 
the dilemmas they face in doing so within the con-
text of more traditional, positivist approaches fre-
quently favored in academic research settings.
Participatory action research is somewhat new to 
the field of psychology and has not historically been 
utilized frequently in this field. This is likely at least 
in part due to the axiology of PAR as a critical theory 
method that advocates a value-directed (rather than 
value-neutral post-positivism or value-bracketed 
constructivism) stance. Traditionally trained psy-
chologists may be made initially uncomfortable by 
research that is value mediated because psychologi-
cal training often conceives of research as objective, 
in which participants are studied without changing 
them or the researchers.
Feminist Theories
Feminist theories are used to frame and under-
stand research approaches across a range of dis-
ciplines and social problems. They developed in 
part in response to prevailing ideas that more 
traditional scientific inquiry tended to exclude 
women from inquiry and deny women epistemic 
authority (Anderson, 1995). They are often asso-
ciated with critical theory, although they have 
been considered by some to be separate (Crotty, 
1998), yet closely related, within the epistemo-
logical continuum.
History
Informed by the political ideologies of the 1970s 
women’s movement, feminist scholars sought to 
reinterpret and modify concepts within the phi-
losophy of science to create feminist approaches to 
research. Originally fueled by activism, feminism as 
an academic focus has developed significantly from 
the 1980s until the present. According to feminist 
paradigms, the traditional philosophy of science has 
tended to produce theories that represent women 
(or their activities and interests) as inferior to their 
male counterparts. Further, “feminine” cognitive 
styles and modes of knowledge have been denigrated 
by traditional inquiry (Anderson, 1995), producing 
knowledge that is not relevant to people in subordi-
nate positions and/or that reinforces unequal power 
dynamics, particularly as it relates to gender.
Foundational assumptions
Feminist theories “place gender at the center of 
inquiry,” and yet “increasingly incorporate mul-
tiple. . . intersectionalities of identity,” including 
sexuality, race, religion, and social class (Marshall & 
Rossman, 2010, p.  27). Similar to critical theory, 
the larger aim of feminist theories is to turn thought 
into action (Marshall & Rossman, 2010), in this 
case by focusing on the issues faced by women and 
other often marginalized groups.
Epistemologically, feminist theories focus on the 
accounts of women (and other historically marginal-
ized groups) as legitimate and core sources of knowl-
edge. Of note, feminist theories are not distinguished 
so much by their substantive topic (e.g., women’s 
issues, gender, reproductive rights, etc.) or by the gen-
der of the researcher (i.e., male or female) but rather 
by their orientation and guiding philosophy on epis-
temology and research creation (e.g., methodology).
implications For researcH metHods
Over the past two decades, feminist scholars 
have developed alternative epistemologies to guide 
the process of doing research. Feminist method-
ologies attempt to eradicate sexist bias in research 
while capturing women’s voices, particularly those 
consistent with feminist ideals. Epistemologically, 
feminist theories privilege women’s experiences 
as not only legitimate, but also as important and 
revealing bases of knowledge. Work guided by 
feminist theories often aims to employ qualita-
tive methodologies toward the exploration of 
power imbalances, starting with that between the 
researcher and researched (Marshall & Rossman, 
2010), so as to engender trust and collect accurate 
data. Research informed by feminist theory, like 
critical theory more broadly, also challenges aca-
demia traditionally due to its value of application 
of research to lived experiences (Smart, 2009), 
particularly among those who are oppressed. 
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Thus, feminist theories mirror the core values of 
critical theory in emphasizing the mutual learn-
ing between the researcher and the researched, an 
exchange that is critical to the emancipation of 
disenfranchised or overlooked groups.
Feminist research has emphasized the impor-
tance of exploring the day-to-day experiences 
of marginalized groups, particularly women. 
Qualitative approaches are particularly well-suited 
to capturing the “messiness” of these daily experi-
ences because these methods can account for emo-
tions, as well as for other less tangible aspects of 
experience, in data collection. Often, feminist 
theories invite more traditional forms of qualitative 
data collection (e.g., interviewing, focus groups, 
ethnography) to be adapted to be more consistent 
with feminist ideology.
application
As referenced earlier, a feminist approach to 
research can be employed across the social as well 
as physical sciences and beyond. For the most part, 
researchers employing this approach attempt to 
eradicate sexist bias in research while seeking to cap-
ture women’s voices, particularly as they apply to the 
day-to-day experiences of everyday life. This angle 
lends itself well to studies such as those examining 
the experiences of domestic workers and domestic 
violence. Core to the use of feminist theory is the 
understanding that ways of knowing, or epistemol-
ogies, are constantly evolving as knowledge grows 
and as the “knowers” expand in scope. Thus, bodies 
of research, as they make use of a feminist lens, may 
find that the social problem under study increases 
the complexity of the problem under study. This is 
characteristic of feminist methodologies. However, 
such an approach is also characterized by reducing 
the hierarchical relationship between researchers 
and their participants to facilitate trust and disclo-
sure and recognizing and reflecting on the emotion-
ality of women’s lives.
Queer Theory
History
With the rise of the gay liberation movement in 
the post-Stonewall era, gay and lesbian perspectives 
began to contribute to politics, philosophy, and 
social theory. Initially, these were often connected 
to feminist ideology. However, in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, queer theory was developed as its own 
framework. The term “queer,” as opposed to “gay 
and lesbian,” also distinguished the theory from 
those that preceded it, specifically gay liberation 
theories. Similar to feminist theories, queer theory 
was accompanied by social movements, and its 
emergence evolved in part as a reaction to the mar-
ginalization of the LBGTQ community and the 
ways by which “science” had historically been used 
against them (Minton, 1997).
Queer theory found a more natural home in 
qualitative research because this form had histori-
cally been less focused on objective reality and more 
on subjective experiences (Downing & Gillett, 
2011). However, its emergence has occurred within 
an ongoing evolution in terms of how we consider 
sexuality and marginalization in research and in 
society at large. In the early 1900s, the scientific 
examination of those who were in same-sex rela-
tionships was perpetually challenged by the stigma 
and silence faced by this group. In short, this pop-
ulation was hard to identify and find, much less 
research. The second half of the twentieth century, 
however, shifted this as lesbian and gay studies 
expanded exponentially (Gamson, 2000), focusing 
explicitly on the lives of those who identify as gay 
or lesbian. Queer theory, a more recent arrival on 
the scene, has introduced a post-structuralist cri-
tique by suggesting that the self cannot and should 
not be identified by sexuality or sexual orienta-
tion by itself, thereby challenging the importance 
of studying sexuality as a “subject” of inquiry. 
Although the tension proposed by these shifts is 
often applauded within the qualitative research 
world (e.g., Gamson, 2000), it is this context in 
which queer theory has emerged.
Foundational assumptions
Queer theory was separate from gay liberation 
theories in several ways. First, queer theory defined 
itself as not specific only to sexuality. Instead, queer 
theory does not refer to a nature, be it sexual or oth-
erwise, but rather as a relational construct. “Queer” 
refers specifically to being “outside the norm”; this 
norm can vary relative to context. In other words, 
“Queer is. . . whatever is at odds with the normal, the 
legitimate, the dominant. There is nothing in par-
ticular to which it necessarily refers. It is an identity 
without an essence” (Halperin, 1995, p. 62; empha-
sis in the original).
Because queer theory does not suggest a specific 
nature or essence, it therefore is inclusive of those 
who may express themselves outside any norm, 
including that of the gay and lesbian community. In 
other words, sadomasochism, perhaps marginalized 
by some constructs, is not so according to queer 
theory. Additionally, this lack of focus on a specific 
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essence allows gays and lesbians to identify by their 
sexuality or by any other aspect of their identity, 
thereby placing the focus on personal meaning, as 
opposed to societally ascribed labels.
implications For researcH metHods
A central claim of queer theorists, which is 
that identity is understood exclusively as a social 
construct (rather than given by nature), signifi-
cantly affects how research is carried out within 
this approach. Most immediately, it implies that 
research needs to be evaluated for biases that privi-
lege heterosexuality (Butler, 1990; 1993), however 
subtle. Based on the concern that queer theory 
places on false dichotomies (e.g., “closeted” and 
“out,” etc.), this theory also is critical of other 
dichotomies implied in research, particularly as it 
relates to assumptions regarding what is natural or 
artificial and what is masculine versus feminine. 
Instead, queer theory emphasizes the importance of 
understanding categories more fluidly, an approach 
that lends itself more toward qualitative methods, 
which seek to explore social phenomena with an eye 
toward complexity rather than standardization.
application
Queer theory has been applied to multiple social 
problems and developmental issues. However, 
it is most often applied to questions concerning 
empowerment, resistance to domination (e.g., het-
erosexism, homophobia), gender identity and mar-
ginalization due to gender, sexual orientation, or 
sexual behavior. Because queer theory is concerned 
with the nonessential nature of sexual identity, this 
theory pushes the field to consider identity from 
multiple perspectives, and invites cultural as well as 
race-related inquiry.
Conclusion and Future Directions
It is impossible to fully represent the richness 
of any one of these philosophical approaches in a 
chapter such as this one. We have instead tried to 
convey a sense of the breadth of the field and to 
illuminate at least some of the meaningful distinc-
tions in the major approaches to qualitative research 
in psychology today. In this last section, we turn our 
attention to the future and identify three overarch-
ing, interrelated, and contested issues with which 
the field is being confronted and will be compelled 
to address as we move forward:  retaining the rich 
diversity that has defined the field, the articulation 
of recognizable standards for qualitative research, 
and the commensurability of differing approaches. 
The contested nature of these issues stems in part 
from the very diversity of philosophical approaches 
that has defined the field. Here, again, we cannot 
possibly represent the considerable thought behind 
and debate around each of these matters. Rather, we 
simply raise and mark them at this time.
The diversity of approaches represented in the field 
of qualitative research today speaks to the strength 
of the movement and bodes well for our efforts to 
both advance and deepen our understanding of the 
psychological world. As Ann Hartman (1990) wrote 
many years ago, “each way of knowing deepens our 
understanding and adds another dimension to our 
view of the world” (p. 3). Just as no single research 
design or data collection method can adequately 
capture the multidimensional nature of human psy-
chology, no one philosophical approach can suitably 
guide our efforts to address the full range of questions 
that need to be pursued to develop the knowledge 
needed “to benefit society and improve people’s lives” 
(American Psychological Association, 2013).
However, this diversity in approaches to quali-
tative research also creates significant tensions and 
makes attempts to “define” the field quite challeng-
ing. Despite the substantial work done by many 
scholars (c.f. Denzin & Lincoln, 2013) to delineate 
these contrasting perspectives and approaches, a 
lack of awareness remains, especially (but not exclu-
sively) among those not well-versed in qualitative 
methods. The predictable misunderstandings and 
strong differences in beliefs about what is “credible” 
research that can result continue to plague those of 
us who practice qualitative research as we strive to 
get our work funded and published more widely. 
Peer reviews of our work can often be riddled with 
contradictory assessments of its rigor and even of 
its basic value or contribution. (c.f. Ceglowski, 
Bacigalupa, & Peck, 2011).
Continued efforts to make clear the diversity of 
approaches, the philosophical assumptions guiding 
these, and the particular contributions the differing 
approaches make to our understanding of psychol-
ogy are critical. We must be cautious about making 
general claims about rigor and the “right” way to do 
qualitative research that are actually framed within 
our own narrower terms or experience with certain 
approaches. Keeping the richness of the field alive 
will require discipline on all of our parts to respond 
to questions about how best to go about engaging 
in high quality qualitative research or evaluating the 
quality of the work of others by first acknowledging 
“it depends” and then inquiring about the philo-
sophical approach, aims, and context of the work.
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One of the biggest challenges before us is the 
continued articulation of recognizable standards for 
qualitative research that represent, and which ideally 
can be applied to, the full range of approaches. The 
very differences in purpose and aims and in philo-
sophical approaches that comprise the rich field of 
qualitative research today makes such efforts seem 
impossible. However, ignoring this task in the era 
of what has been called the scientifically based 
research movement (National Research Council, 
2002; Torrance, 2008), defined largely in terms of 
experimental design and methods and with random-
ized controlled trials heralded as the “gold standard,” 
leaves the array of approaches that do not readily fit 
this mold highly vulnerable. But what is the best way 
to address these complex and high-stakes issues?
Researchers taking a more post-positivistic 
approach have argued that there are separate but 
parallel sets of standards for validity and reliabil-
ity in qualitative and quantitative research (e.g., 
Hammersley, 1992; Kuzel & Engel, 2001). Some 
constructivists have put forth that a common set 
of standards can be established but because the 
foundational philosophical approaches between 
post-positivism and constructivism are so differ-
ent, a separate and distinct set of criteria need to be 
applied. Models using concepts such as trustwor-
thiness, transferability, and authenticity have been 
developed (e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 1989), and it 
is estimated that more than 100 quality appraisal 
forms have been put forth (Saini & Shlonsky, 
2012). Unfortunately, most do not make clear the 
philosophical assumptions that undergird them 
(Saini & Shlonsky, 2012), which unfortunately fur-
ther muddies the water. Moreover, other adherents 
to constructivist approaches hold that the contex-
tual and relational nature of knowledge construc-
tion precludes the possibility of establishing such 
standards (e.g., Lincoln, 1995; Schwandt, 1996). 
Finally, many working from within critical theory 
and related approaches suggest that such standards 
are inevitably formed by the power structures in 
which they are housed, thereby potentially further 
perpetuating the inequalities the research aims 
to address or study (e.g., Garrett & Hodkinson, 
1998). Furthermore, they assert that the quality of 
the research should be based on an assessment of 
whether it empowered participants to effect mean-
ingful and lasting changes (Correa, 2013).
Some have tried to resolve these tensions by 
suggesting guidelines they believe account for and 
are applicable across the diversity of approaches 
to qualitative research (e.g., Drisko, 1997; Saini 
& Shlonsky, 2012; Tracy, 2010). These guidelines 
focus on the different components of the research 
process, such as clear identification of philosophi-
cal approach and aims of the research, specification 
of methods and congruence between these and the 
stated philosophical approach and aims, and trans-
parency and clarity in sampling, data collection, 
and data analytic procedures. Although the impera-
tive to tackle these issues is clear, the way forward to 
doing this is less so. Should we push further toward 
agreeing on a shared set of standards that can be 
applied across traditions, or invest in more localized 
ones tailored specifically to particular approaches 
(e.g., narrative analysis) and developed by schol-
ars practicing these (Preissle, 2013), or both? How 
might the myriad elements of research, including 
the many gatekeeping activities in the research and 
scholarship enterprise from funding through pub-
lication of research findings, address and accom-
modate these standards in their expectations and 
processes? What is clear is that the diversity of 
approaches to qualitative research must be fully rep-
resented in any efforts to further define and move 
the field forward on this front.
Embracing and fully representing the diversity 
of approaches and coming to terms with standards 
for them stills leaves unaddressed a third concern 
for the field moving forward, namely what has been 
referred to as the commensurability of approaches. 
That is, whether approaches rooted in the differ-
ing philosophical approaches can be “retrofitted to 
each other in ways that make the simultaneously 
practice of both possible” (Lincoln et  al., 2013, 
p. 238). Some, such as critical and feminist theo-
rists, have argued that epistemological differences 
between methods can render research paradigms 
incompatible (Lincoln et  al., 2013). Others have 
dismissed assertions about irreconcilable differences 
between philosophical approaches and research par-
adigms and argue for what they call a “pragmatic” 
approach, particularly in the service of carrying 
out mixed-methods research (e.g., Creswell, 2009; 
Creswell & Clark, 2007; Maxcy, 2003). Lincoln, 
Lynham, and Guba (2013) take a middle position 
and offer a “cautious” endorsement of the com-
mensurability of approaches. They assert that some 
approaches share some elements that are similar or 
strongly related and therefore can be effectively and 
meaningfully combined, whereas others are more 
“contradictory and mutually exclusive” (p.  239). 
Preissle (2013), in her consideration of the future of 
the field, makes a pragmatic argument of a different 
sort for commensurability. Citing the work of her 
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students that has combined approaches in uncon-
ventional yet highly productive ways, she observes 
that the novice scholars of today are “challenging, 
even transgressing, epistemological and theoretical 
boundaries” that will ultimately move research for-
ward in unexpected ways” (p. 536).
There is nothing new about these questions. 
They have been debated for decades now, and clar-
ity seems no nearer. What has changed is the cli-
mate. It is at once more open to qualitative methods 
than ever before and less accommodating of the 
rich diversity among the approaches taken to this 
work. Increasing numbers of graduate students are 
being trained in multiple methodologies. Although, 
unfortunately, there does not yet appear to be a cry 
for purely qualitative studies on the horizon, most 
major funding sources are at least indicating a prefer-
ence for the use of multiple methods, in some cases 
even quite strongly so. Qualitative studies can be 
found in journals of differing ilk, not just within the 
confines of those dedicated to publishing qualita-
tive research. However, what is deemed acceptable 
or “credible” qualitative research is narrowing. In 
the parlance of the old expression “a little knowl-
edge is a dangerous thing,” the widening exposure 
and reach of qualitative work means that many more 
scholars are encountering and engaging with it in 
some way; these scholars often do not realize that 
what they know is but a small slice of a now large 
and longstanding field. Researchers outside the field 
of qualitative research who participate in setting the 
standards for research more broadly may be friendly 
to particular kinds of approaches, such as seeing a 
place for qualitative work only in the exploration of 
new areas of inquiry to offer “thick description” and 
examples or to complement or round out the quanti-
tative findings, but much less so to stand-alone work 
or work aimed at explicating processes and mecha-
nisms at work in human psychology. Scholars from 
within who are joining in the work of setting the 
standards of research can sometimes allow certain 
kinds of qualitative research to stand for the field, 
which can serve to belie and even shut out other, 
often more transgressive forms. These perhaps seem-
ingly old and familiar questions about philosophies 
of science, rigor, and commensurability are alive and 
well, taking new forms, and they are, in some ways, 
more important now than ever before.
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